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The Emergence of the Bristol School of Multiculturalism1 
Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood 
 
Abstract: Geoffrey Levey plausibly describes how a group of scholars who he calls the ‘Bristol School 
of Multiculturalism’ (BSM) differ from scholars who are often called Liberal Multiculturalists (LMs). 
We expand Levey’s analysis by showing what in the history of the BSM’s thought made the liberalism 
and the multiculturalism of LMs unconvincing for BSM scholars. Hence, we show how certain thinkers 
influenced BSM scholars in ways that made them unwilling to offer liberal theories and how BSM 
scholars began their work with multiculturalist ideas that differ from the multiculturalist ideas of LMs.  
 
‘Multiculturalist’ scholars often show how to reduce the exclusion and discrimination 
that cultural minorities suffer. They also often emphasise the liberal nature of their thought and 
thus are often called ‘liberal multiculturalists’ (LMs) (Kymlicka, 1995; Carens, 2000; Patten, 
2014).2 Yet Geoffrey Levey identifies a different group of multiculturalist scholars who share 
ideas and collaborate together, and which, he argues, we, the authors of this article, belong to. 
Levey calls these multiculturalists the ‘Bristol School of Multiculturalism’ (BSM). While he 
describes how BSM scholars differ from LMs, we examine in this article why BSM scholars 
became unwilling to articulate ‘dominant’ LM views (Crowder, 2013, p.39). We do so by 
showing what in the history of the BSM’s thought made the liberalism and multiculturalism of 
LMs unconvincing for BSM scholars. Thus, we show how certain thinkers influenced BSM 
scholars in ways that made them unwilling to offer liberal theories; and how BSM scholars 
began their work with multiculturalist ideas that differ from the multiculturalist ideas of LMs. 
We thus accept Levey’s claim that we are part of a distinct school of multicultural 
thought, as he uses ample textual evidence to show a consensus among BSM scholars that 
differs from the consensus that exists among LMs.  Yet Levey says little about why BSM 
scholars became unwilling to become LMs and it is important to do so for at least two reasons. 
First, understanding why BSM scholars became unwilling to accept ‘dominant’ LM scholarly 
views helps us to understand the differences between multiculturalists that Levey identifies. 
Second, when we understand more about why BSM scholars became unwilling to articulate 
LM approaches, it also becomes easier to discern whether it was error or insight that prevented 
BSM scholars from discussing multiculturalism as LMs have done. But note the following. 
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Others specify whether they exhibit error or insight when discussing a school of thought 
of which they are a part (Pocock, 1971; 2006). But we will not do so as we want to avoid 
offering a self-serving account of why BSM scholars are right. Hence, while we examine the 
textual evidence of why BSM scholars were unconvinced by the liberal and multiculturalist 
nature of LMs we say nothing about whether BSM scholars were right or wrong.  
Like Levey, the BSM scholars who we focus on are ourselves, Bhikhu Parekh and 
Nasar Meer. Kymlicka is the LM whom we refer to most, as other LMs often explicitly state 
that his way of thinking about multiculturalism guides them, even when they disagree with it 
(Carens, 2000, p.73; Patten, 2014, p.5). As the influences on BSM scholars and their 
multiculturalist ideas differ so markedly from the influences and thinking of LMs, a detailed 
exegesis of LM work is not necessary to show why BSM scholars became unwilling to be LMs. 
We proceed in three stages. First, we show how certain thinkers influenced BSM 
scholars in ways that provided them with reasons to not offer liberal theories. Second, we show 
how BSM scholars began their work with multiculturalist ideas that differed from the 
multiculturalist ideas of LMs. Third, we conclude. 
I-Intellectual Influences on BSM Scholars 
Unlike LMs (Kymlicka, 1995, p.75; Carens, 2000, p.6, 87; Patten, 2014, p.6), BSM 
scholars do not say that they offer a liberal theory of multiculturalism. Some might say that 
this is because BSM scholars explicitly criticise the ideas of certain liberal thinkers (Modood, 
2007, p.27; Parekh, 2000a, p.14). However, this explains only why BSM scholars reject the 
ideas of particular liberals, not why they are unwilling to offer any explicitly liberal theory. 
This unwillingness can be explained when we examine how Michael Oakeshott and other 
thinkers influenced the two most sophisticated BSM accounts of multiculturalism: Parekh’s 
and Modood’s. Consider first how Oakeshott’s work on the nature of philosophy influenced 
Parekh in ways that made him unwilling to articulate a liberal theory of multiculturalism.  
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Parekh (1982, p.231; 1991, p.102) was taught by Oakeshott, and explicitly states that 
Oakeshott’s Experience and its Modes (EM) influenced him. To understand how the influence 
of EM discouraged Parekh from offering a liberal theory, note what is argued in EM.  
In EM, Oakeshott distinguishes philosophy from other scholarly inquiries, such as 
history or science, by noting that all such scholarly inquiries are ‘worlds of ideas’ that remain 
‘abstract’ until we examine and relate the presuppositions on which they rest. Hence, we might, 
for example, examine how history presupposes conceptions of ‘time’ and ‘change’, or how 
science presupposes conceptions of ‘regularity’ and ‘prediction’. Philosophy does just this, as 
it removes such abstraction by examining and relating all such presuppositions so as to present 
‘a unity of … irreducible’ ideas (Oakeshott, 1933, p.348 emphasis added). Of course, 
presuppositions that are examined and related are no longer presupposed, thus philosophy is 
ideally a presuppositionless inquiry. And ‘political doctrines’ such as ‘liberalism’ are not 
philosophy if they are too ‘dependent’ on unexamined presuppositions about, for example, 
what ‘morality’, ‘principles’, ‘the good’, ‘the right’ and so on are (Oakeshott, 1938, p.xii) 
EM influenced Parekh (2000a, p.13, 44, 84–86, 339), who thus repeatedly claims that 
liberal theorists offer ‘political’, but not philosophical, ‘doctrines’, and he shows how they 
ignore their presuppositions. Such liberals are thus said to start, as Levey (2019a, p.204) also 
claims, by stating and defining their liberal beliefs in, for example, individual freedom, and 
then they show what follows from these beliefs (Parekh, 2000b, p.251). But such beliefs in 
individual freedom presuppose ideas about when, why and how to individuate people so as to 
think of them as individuals as we might want to think of them as, for example, dependent 
children or as parents instead. Parekh thought that philosophers examine, relate and thus defend 
such fundamental presuppositions on their way to ‘arriving at’ defensible versions of their 
political beliefs; and should not simply start with such liberal beliefs.  
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Liberals who ignore this encounter a problem: their liberal beliefs cannot be thought 
true until their presuppositions are examined, related and thus defended. Parekh could, of 
course, have examined and related the presuppositions of such liberal beliefs and then shown 
what follows from them for cultural groups. This would have resulted in a liberal theory that 
is philosophical in EM’s sense, but a very different thinker discouraged this course of action.   
Parekh (1982a, p.15; 1982b, p.187; 1986, p.15; 2000b, p.251) states that while writing 
extensively about Marx (1973, p.265) he learned about where a thinker’s presuppositions come 
from. Hence, Parekh notes that a thinker ‘is … a member of a specific group, within a specific 
society’, and the ideas of this specific group are ‘taken for granted’ and thus presupposed. This 
led Parekh (2000a, p.10, 14) to argue that liberal political theorists presuppose a ‘way of life’ 
in which their ‘concepts, assumptions and answers’ are plausible; but this way of life is one of 
many in a multicultural society. Thus, when using the concepts, assumptions and answers of 
one way of life, such theorists display a ‘bias’ towards that way of life; and their arguments 
may not ‘carry conviction’ with those in a multicultural society who have other ways of life.  
Hence, if Parekh examined and related the presuppositions of liberal beliefs and showed 
what follows for cultural groups he would not escape this cultural bias. He would defend it. 
Instead, Parekh (2000a, p.339) examines, relates and defends the presuppositions of 
intercultural dialogue among culturally diverse citizens as such dialogue can reveal the cultural 
specificity of their assumptions and conceptions. Such dialogue also helps to resolve disputes 
among citizens (Uberoi, 2015a). Again, the idea of such dialogue came from a thinker whom 
Parekh (1990, p.39) wrote books about: Gandhi. Parekh thus built his reputation writing about 
many thinkers, some of whom discouraged him from offering a liberal theory, while others 
showed him how to proceed in ways that differ from liberal theorists.  
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Similarly, Modood’s (1984) doctorate focused at length on EM, but it was Oakeshott’s 
later conception of ideology in Rationalism in Politics (RP) that gave him a reason to avoid a 
liberal theory. To understand how this happened, we need to examine certain statements in RP.  
Oakeshott (1993a, p.26; 1993b, p.51, 53, 55) states that an ideology is ‘a system of 
ideas abstracted from the manner in which people have been accustomed to go about the 
business of attending to their collective affairs’, and is used to guide political practice. For 
example, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is said by Oakeshott to be ‘a brief conspectus 
of the manner in which Englishmen were accustomed to go about the business of attending to 
their arrangements’, and was read in America and France as a text to ‘put into practice’. Yet, 
Oakeshott states that it is political behaviour in a polity that is ‘potent’, not ideology which 
merely describes it. What can and does guide political life is the ‘pursuit of intimations’. By 
this, Oakeshott meant that traditions of political behaviour emerge in a polity to regulate it. 
These traditions indicate political changes thus, for example, traditions of treating citizens 
equally indicated to many in Britain in the 1960s why discrimination should be illegal. 
Modood (2007, p.129) explicitly uses Oakeshott’s conception of ideology when 
claiming that ideologies ‘are not a good basis for the diagnosis of problems and strategies for 
reform because they are too abstract and disconnected from a specific society’ and ‘its 
institutions’. Modood (1996, p.178) also claims that LMs such as Kymlicka, despite ‘their 
general language’, have conceptions, concerns and examples that emerge and make sense in 
places such as Canada but are of limited use in other contexts such as Britain. Generalising in 
a manner that obscures contextual roots is exactly what Oakeshott in RP called ideology and 
Modood, following Oakeshott, wanted to offer an approach that is explicitly based on Britain 
and that is primarily for Britain.   
Modood’s (1996, p.178) time at the Commission for Racial Equality and working on 
social science projects made him want to be more ‘concrete’ than LMs by focusing in detail on 
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the policies and norms that comprise the British approach to multiculturalism in four ways. 
First, he examined whether such practices in Britain address the concerns of cultural minorities 
and whether they desired them. Second, he examined whether such practices are justifiable 
(Modood, 1988). Third, he examined what these practices ‘intimate’ about how they can be 
expanded to address the religious groups that they initially excluded (Modood, 1994). Fourth, 
he examined the conceptions of secularism, integration and citizenship that such practices are 
inspired by, and he considered whether these conceptions are defensible (Modood, 2007). 
Modood (2007, p.9) is not being ideological in the sense described in RP, as he is not 
simply abstracting a system of ideas from Britain. Instead he is developing knowledge, in four 
ways, of the British tradition of multiculturalism that has evolved since the race relations 
legislation of the 1960s. In doing so, he has come to understand the worth of this tradition and 
shows why it should expand to address the concerns and desires of religious minorities. 
Modood is thus also engaged in ‘political activity’, which Oakeshott (1993b, p.57) conceives 
as a ‘sympathy’ for a political tradition of behaviour. In recognition of this, Modood (2007, 
p.7) states that he offers neither philosophy nor ideology, but ‘a political perspective’ in which 
he sees why the British tradition of multiculturalism should be defended from the criticism that 
it often receives and why it is still ‘fit for the twenty first century’. 
Similarly, Parekh (2000a, p.337) offers a ‘perspective’ from which he sees why human 
beings are influenced by internally plural cultures and why they benefit from intercultural 
dialogue. As Parekh defends at length what he presupposes, his perspective on multiculturalism 
attempts to be philosophical in the sense that is discussed in EM (Uberoi, 2015a). Hence, 
whereas RP provided Modood with reasons to avoid a liberal multiculturalism such as 
Kymlicka’s and to offer a political perspective, EM gave Parekh reasons to avoid a liberal 
theory and to offer, instead, what he conceived as a philosophical perspective of 
multiculturalism. 
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In time, Uberoi (2015a; 2015b) came to endorse the philosophical perspective of 
multiculturalism that Parekh articulated and to learn much from Modood’s political 
perspective. And Meer (2010, p.2, 46) came to learn much from Parekh’s philosophical 
perspective and to endorse Modood’s political perspective of a ‘British tradition of 
multiculturalism’. Oakeshott thus indirectly influenced both Uberoi and Meer, as the 
philosophical and political perspectives of Parekh and Modood influenced them.   
Yet, a perspective is literally a point of view, a place from which we see something. So 
far, little has been said about what BSM scholars saw about multiculturalism and from where. 
In the next section we identify several ideas that were initially used by BSM scholars in their 
work on multiculturalism. Each idea differs from those of LMs in the following ways. 
II-How BSM scholars approached the topic of multiculturalism  
The first idea is political urgency. All BSM scholars began their work by contributing 
to politically urgent debates about, for example, Enoch Powell (Parekh, 1974b, p.223), the 
Rushdie Affair (Modood, p.1993, p.69), 9/11 and the 2001 riots in Oldham, Burnley and 
Bradford (Meer, 2006; Uberoi, 2007). This is because, unlike an earlier and illustrious 
generation of scholars of immigrant descent in Britain such as Isaiah Berlin and John 
Plamenatz, BSM scholars wanted not only to contribute to knowledge, but also to influence 
long-term political thought about political problems in Britain that relate to cultural minorities.3 
In comparison, the works of LMs were initially influenced by political practices in 
countries such as Canada (See also Patten, 2014, p.viii). Hence, Kymlicka (1999, pp.133-134; 
2016a, p.67) states that he ‘grew up with the assumption that justice required some sort of 
special status for Quebec and Aboriginal peoples’, and initially disagreed with Charles Taylor 
that ‘only communitarianism could defend special rights for groups like the Québécois or 
native Indians’, as he thought liberals could too. In short, political events in Britain initially 
inspired applied scholarship among BSM scholars that focused directly on political debates, 
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but political practices in other countries often initially inspired less applied scholarship among 
LMs about whether liberal theorists could plausibly endorse such political practices.4   
  Second, BSM scholars initially approached their work on multiculturalism with a 
conception of multiculturalism that focuses on immigrants who become citizens and their 
descendants (Parekh, 1974; Modood, 1993; Meer, 2006; Uberoi, 2007). In this, BSM scholars 
are strongly motivated, as Levey (2019a, p.213) notes, by their own South Asian origins and 
the British colonial legacy. In comparison, LMs offer conceptions of multiculturalism that 
focus on other cultural minorities too, namely national minorities and indigenous peoples 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p.37). 
It might seem, then, that BSM scholars neglect other cultural minorities. Yet, as already 
noted, BSM scholars are focused on Britain where issues that relate to indigenous peoples, 
such as the Inuit, do not arise; and where national minorities are conceptualised as part of 
debates other than those about multiculturalism, such as devolution and national independence. 
Such debates can be construed as debates about national minority cultures and be made part of 
multiculturalism, as Kymlicka does. But doing so seems artificial in Britain where no one 
criticises or endorses a national minority multiculturalism. This is because the multiculturalism 
that people have in mind relates to non-white immigrants and their descendants who have a 
history shaped by colonialism and who become citizens.  
Third, when BSM scholars initially focused on immigrants who became citizens, they 
noted that, like other human beings, such people were ‘unique’ individuals and that they 
‘belong to economic, political and cultural, religious and other groups’ (Parekh, 1978, p.36; 
Modood, 1993, p.85; Meer, 2010, p.77; Uberoi, 2007, p.131). But BSM scholars did not claim 
that individuals are more important than cultural groups. This is because this claim presupposes 
that a person can be individuated from a cultural group even though cultural groups provide 
patterns of thought that influence individuals and often also a language in which they think. 
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Cultural groups thus form individuals just as individuals form cultural groups; the two cannot 
be separated. Yet, at times, thinking of immigrants who become citizens as individuals is more 
important, for example, to uphold their individual rights. At other times, thinking of them as 
groups is more important so as to, for example, fight stereotypes as these focus on groups.  
In comparison, LMs such as Kymlicka (1989, p.140 emphasis added) privilege 
‘individuals’ as ‘the ultimate units of moral worth’. Kymlicka (1995, p.75), of course, thinks 
that groups are important too. But he defends group rights only if they are ‘consistent with 
individual freedom’, and shows why such rights should not be used to restrict the freedoms of 
individuals because he prioritises individuals over groups. However, BSM scholars address the 
same issue by noting instances when conceptualising cultural minorities as individuals is more 
important than conceptualising them as a group and instances when this must be reversed and 
it is more important to conceptualise cultural minorities as groups.   
Fourth, when BSM scholars first wrote about immigrants who become citizens and their 
descendants, religious minorities and, in particular, Muslims were often the focus (Parekh, 
1974, p.229; Modood, 1990; Meer, 2006; Uberoi and Modood, 2010). This is partly because 
Muslims were central to controversies such as the Rushdie Affair, 9/11 and the 2001 riots and 
BSM scholars were focusing on these controversies. Hence, some BSM scholars initially wrote 
about religion, Islamophobia, secularism and so on (Parekh, 1989, p.24; Modood, 1993, p.85; 
1994; Meer, 2006; 2010) as part of their way of thinking about multiculturalism, and continue 
to do so. Indeed, some have made the theme of rethinking secularism central to their conception 
of multiculturalism (Modood forthcoming 2019).  
In comparison, Kymlicka candidly admits of his book Multicultural Citizenship (MC), 
‘there are gaps and omissions that, in retrospect, are pretty glaring. One is the issue of religion, 
which is largely absent from MC. This partly reflects the politics of the time. When I first came 
to these issues in the late eighties and early nineties, the issue of religious difference and 
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religious accommodation was not at the heart of the debate about multiculturalism’ (Kymlicka, 
2016, p.396). In regard to secularism, he states: ‘Insofar as I discussed it at all in MC, what I 
said expressed a pretty knee-jerk unreflective commitment to a kind of American-style 
secularism’ (Kymlicka, 2016b, p.396). These admirably honest claims are true, except for the 
fact that at the heart of the debate about multiculturalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
Britain, at least, were issues of religious difference resulting from debates about the Rushdie 
Affair (Modood, 1990, p.149; Parekh, 1990, p.703). BSM scholars focus on urgent issues in 
Britain and thus they engaged with religious difference and secularism at a time when LMs did 
not.  
Fifth, BSM scholars, with the exception of Parekh, initially wanted to balance their 
contribution to political theory with extensive empirical research. They led surveys that 
examined the views and circumstances of ethnic minorities (Modood et.al, 1997). They also 
interviewed politicians in order to identify reasons for their attitudes towards Muslims that are 
not offered in their speeches (Uberoi and Modood, 2010, p.304). They examined archival 
evidence of the intentions of politicians when creating policies of multiculturalism (Uberoi, 
2009). They also analysed newspaper articles so as to show how fear of Muslims is constructed 
(Meer, 2010, p.182). These and other empirical works were accompanied by conceptual work 
on how racism takes the form not only of colour racism, but also of a racism that targets cultural 
and religious differences of non-white minorities (Modood, 1997; Meer and Modood, 2009; 
Meer, 2010). Levey (2019a, p.220) is thus right to assert that BSM scholars contribute to 
normative political theory, but they also conduct empirical and conceptual research that seems 
more social-scientific.  
In comparison, LMs such as Kymlicka analyse what existing empirical evidence 
suggests (Kymlicka, 2010; 2015) and collaborate with social scientists so as to produce 
sophisticated empirical research (Kymlicka and Banting 2006; 2017). But the primary 
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contribution of LMs is to political theory (Kymlicka, 1989; 1995; 2001; Carens; 2000; Patten, 
2014). Likewise, most LMs do not conduct research on what minorities themselves think about 
their identities, racism and exclusion, the claims of politicians and journalists or the nature and 
types of racism. In contrast, for most BSM scholars the empirical study of precisely these 
subjects is as important as their work in political theory. 
Sixth, BSM scholars began their work by considering how Britain is conceptualised 
and envisaged by British people (Parekh; 1974, p.231; Modood, 1993, p.5; Meer, 2010, p.2; 
Uberoi, 2007, p.150). This is because if most British people have conceptions of Britain that 
exclude cultural minorities, then they will think of such minorities as outsiders. This can 
exacerbate the exclusion and discrimination that cultural minorities often experience and make 
such minorities unwilling to be part of a group that mistreats them. However, if most British 
people have conceptions of Britain that include cultural minorities as normal and equal citizens, 
then the cultural differences of such minorities are less likely to seem abnormal to others in 
Britain. Such cultural differences are also thus less likely to be feared and to seem like 
something to avoid. When British people have inclusive conceptions of Britain, it helps to 
reduce their fear of cultural difference.  
Equally, if British people have conceptions of Britain that include cultural minorities 
as normal and equal citizens then such conceptions foster unity. This is because such 
conceptions allow British people to envisage themselves as a culturally diverse unit or group, 
which, in turn, is necessary if they are to conceptualise collective goals and challenges that 
they can meet together. Such inclusive conceptions of Britain thus foster a unity among 
culturally diverse citizens which also reduces their fear of one another’s cultural differences.  
Such conceptions of Britain are, of course, another way of discussing national identity, 
and LMs, too, note the value of national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p.188; 2015, p.12). 
However, they say little about national identity compared to their primary focus: trying to 
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identify a ‘liberal approach to minority rights’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p.75) and to determine 
whether such rights are just or whether there are ‘strong cultural rights’ (Patten, 2014, p.11).5  
For BSM scholars, justice and rights feature infrequently in their political vocabulary 
but not because theoretical questions about rights for cultural groups are unimportant. BSM 
scholars focus on conceptions of the nation that exclude minorities despite their formal 
individual and group rights, and show what can happen if such conceptions become inclusive, 
as doing so seems more politically urgent in Britain. The theoretical priorities expressed in 
significant LM works differ from the political priorities of BSM scholars. 
Seventh, BSM scholars began their work by advocating the importance of intercultural 
dialogue in a multicultural society as it leads to intercultural learning (Parekh, 1974b, p.42; 
Modood, 1993, p.69; Meer, 2010, p.46; Uberoi, 2007, pp.151–52). Intercultural dialogue is 
also particularly useful when there are disagreements between the members of different cultural 
groups. To illustrate this use, consider a controversial minority practice such as polygamy.    
Most cultural majorities in Western societies reject this practice, but the practice need 
not breach any human rights. Nor need it be inequitable if women can engage in polyandry and 
take more than one husband. Such reasons make a ban difficult to justify; and even with such 
a ban, the practice can continue covertly. What is required is a dialogue in which members of 
a cultural minority who favour the practice become convinced that it is unjustifiable, or a 
cultural majority come to accept that the practice is justifiable or at least tolerable.  
In comparison, an LM such as Kymlicka (1995, pp.122–123) assumes some informal 
intercultural dialogue when he notes the ‘educational benefits’ of cultural diversity. But such 
dialogue is given limited importance as it does not justify minority rights. BSM scholars, 
however, as we noted earlier, are less concerned with justifying minority rights; and unlike 
LMs, they note how intercultural dialogue is beneficial because it can help to resolve the 
controversies that are inevitable in multicultural societies.6 
  13 
 In summary, BSM scholars began their scholarship on multiculturalism in opposition 
to LMs, by disputing the need for a liberal theory. Unlike LMs, BSM scholars were 
contributing to political debates in Britain that focused on racially marked immigrants who 
became citizens and formed ethnic identities, especially Muslims. Equally, unlike LMs, BSM 
scholars did not prioritise individuals over groups, they valued minority ‘voice’ about formal 
rights, and they conducted a wealth of empirical research and prioritised national identity and 
intercultural dialogue in ways that LMs did not.  
Some may, of course, say that the types of policies that LMs and BSM scholars 
advocate are likely to be similar and this is true. But this does not change the fact that BSM 
scholars would not defend such policies using the liberalism or the multiculturalism of LMs, 
as BSM scholars approached their work on multiculturalism with a different set of ideas. The 
presence of these ideas meant that even though the seminal LM works of Kymlicka were widely 
cited and well-known by the time Modood was writing about multiculturalism, as were other 
LM works by the time Uberoi and Meer were writing about multiculturalism, all three thought 
that they had much to learn from LMs, but that they need not become LMs. They adopted a 
different course which Levey describes, and they thought such a course was possible as people 
such as Parekh had been charting it since the 1970s (Modood, 2014; Uberoi, 2018).   
Conclusion 
In this article, we have focused on the ideas that BSM scholars initially used in their 
scholarship and their intellectual influences in order to extend Levey’s analysis in a historical 
direction. It seems pertinent to conclude by discussing two small aspects of Levey’s analysis 
that we disagree with before we briefly discuss the future of the BSM. 
First, Levey criticises the way that BSM scholars identify the following two ways of 
thinking and talking about national identity. BSM scholars note how we might, for example, 
refer to ‘Britain’s identity’, which is a conception of what Britain is, or a person’s British 
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identity which is one of many identities that a person might exhibit when they say they ‘feel 
British’ (Parekh, 2008, p.56; Uberoi and Modood, 2013, p.25; Uberoi, 2018, pp.50-51). Levey 
(2019a, pp.215-216) claims that ‘the distinction drawn between Britain’s identity (polity) and 
British identity (personal) does not quite do, as even the latter is understood in terms of aspects 
of the polity that individuals share and identify with (e.g. laws, taxes, welfare, state symbols 
and ceremonies, national sports teams ….)’. Levey is thus claiming that BSM scholars do not 
appreciate how the two ways of thinking and talking about national identity are related. 
Yet Parekh (2008, p.54) explicitly states that they are ‘related’ and Uberoi (2015a, p.81; 
2018, p.51) explicitly and repeatedly shows how in the following ways:  
The two ways of thinking and talking about national identity are related …. a person cannot plausibly say that 
they feel ‘British’ or ‘English’ without having any notion of Britain or England. Equally, the relationship 
between these two ways of thinking about national identity can be empirically significant. This is because if 
ethnic minorities in Britain think that British people are solely white and Christian, then such minorities might 
think it strange to think of themselves as British. And if many in England think that England is a white and 
Christian nation, they may think that ethnic minorities cannot be English. The conceptions of a polity or a nation 
that its members have can thus influence how they think about their own and one another’s national identities.’  
 
Indeed, BSM scholars are hesitant to refer to these two ways of thinking and talking about 
national identity as what Levey calls a ‘distinction’ precisely because they acknowledge that 
these two ways of thought are related and Levey seems to have inadvertently missed this.  
 The second point of disagreement with Levey (2019a, p.216) is his claim that Parekh 
is more apprehensive about governments ‘forging a national cultural identity’ than Modood 
and Uberoi. Yet the difference between Modood and Parekh on the role of government seems 
exaggerated as the Commission for Multi-Ethnic Britain’s report (CMEB, 2000, p.229) says 
‘political leaders should … lead the country in re-imagining Britain …. and in ensuring that 
the national story is inclusive of everyone’. Both Parekh and Modood helped to write this report 
thus they have both argued, in print, that political leaders should lead the process of 
encouraging inclusive conceptions of a country among its citizens.  
But Levey’s claim is more plausible in relation to Uberoi (2007, p.152) whose early 
work does suggest that governments should ‘create’ what he calls a multicultural national 
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identity. But this early work was immediately followed by more caveated pieces that offer a 
‘hypothesis’ (Uberoi, 2008, p. 408) about the extent to which a government can alter a national 
identity. Likewise, there are later pieces which state that ‘no government can promote a single 
conception of a polity without running the risk of this conception seeming like it is artificial 
and it is being imposed on those who think about their polity differently’ (Uberoi, 2018, p.54). 
With this in mind, Uberoi, like Parekh and Modood, gives a leadership role to governments in 
promoting inclusive conceptions of a country in the following way that all three would endorse.   
Governments should reject conceptions of their country in which its citizens are solely 
of one faith or race. Governments should also prohibit discrimination and promote race 
equality. Over time, this alters what many citizens think is permissible in a polity, thus 
illustrating that their conceptions of it have changed. A government should also authorise 
school curricula to teach children about the different cultures and religions in the country. In 
such limited ways, governments can discourage exclusive conceptions of a country and 
encourage inclusive ones. But Parekh (2008. p.65), Modood (2007, p.153) and Uberoi (2018, 
p.54) all reject governments stating exactly what these conceptions should contain and accept 
that such conceptions should be ‘woven in debate and discussion and not reduced to a list’.  
Let us now turn from these minor disagreements to the future of the BSM. Some might 
find the idea of a future for a multicultural school of thought odd as they think multiculturalism 
is politically and intellectually dead. Yet policies of multiculturalism have remained and 
expanded (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013; Matheiu 2017). Claims about multiculturalists using 
essentialist conceptions of groups or culture have been shown to be implausible as have claims 
that policies of multiculturalism are divisive (Modood, 2007; Uberoi, 2008; Mason, 2007; 
Kymlicka, 2010; 2015). And alternatives to multiculturalism, such as interculturalism, have 
been shown to be inadequate by critics and advocates of multiculturalism alike (Modood, 2017; 
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Joppke, 2017). The political and intellectual death of multiculturalism has been exaggerated, 
and BSM scholars are trying to rise to new political challenges such as the following. 
As anti-immigrant sentiment and political parties spread along with exclusive ideas of 
the nation, it is politically urgent to understand the nature and causes of such sentiment.  BSM 
scholars have thus moved from focusing on immigrants who become citizens and their 
descendants to also examining the fears of cultural majorities (Bouchard, 2011) in relation to 
immigration so as to separate reasonable from unreasonable fears (Modood, 2014). Likewise, 
to address the spread of exclusive ideas of nationhood, they offer new work on the importance 
of citizens having inclusive conceptions of their country (Modood, 2018; Uberoi, 2018).  
 Existing BSM scholars are thus attempting to rise to these new challenges but a school 
of thought will adapt as new members apply its ideas in new and different directions that the 
original membership did not consider. This is what is beginning to happen among a number of 
early career scholars whose doctoral or post-doctoral work has been supervised by Modood: 
here are some examples. 
Jan Dobbernack uses a BSM conception of multiculturalism in order to focus on 
bottom-up political mobilisation but thinks this needs to be combined with a genealogical 
approach that is attentive to the obstacles in the way of achieving the normative goals of the 
BSM (Dobbernack, 2018, Dobbernack and Modood, forthcoming). Aleksandra Lewicki 
argues, contrary to the BSM, that national citizenship is insufficient, but when articulating a 
perspective on social justice that is informed by Nancy Fraser, Lewicki (2014a and 2014b) 
replaces Fraser’s conception of recognition with one from the BSM. Terri-Anne Teo (2019, 
forthcoming) explores whether the BSM’s understanding of civic multiculturalism is helpful 
in understanding or improving multiculturalism in Singapore, and argues that it has more 
applicability than other western conceptions if it is extended from citizens to include non-
citizens such as temporary migrants. Erdem Dikici (2016) develops Modood’s idea of 
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integration to show how transnational NGOs strive to integrate new immigrants and their 
descendants into their new national home. Thomas Sealy (2018) develops the BSM defence of 
multiculturalism against interculturalists, advocates of ‘multiculture’ and superdiversity, but 
argues that the BSM’s efforts to include ethnoreligious identity fail to include religiosity-based 
minority identities, such as those of British converts to Islam, and so should be extended to do 
so.  
These early career scholars can be thought of as the ‘next-wave’ of the BSM, and two 
areas of similarity among them are crucial. The first is that their work is sociology informed 
by political theory or vice versa. It straddles disciplines and maintains the balance between 
political theory and empirical research that we referred to earlier. The second similarity is that 
the ‘next-wave’ are not just acolytes. They identify omissions, silences and weakness in the 
thought of BSM scholars that they seek, in their own ways, to address and hopefully in doing 
so will improve and expand BSM scholarship in the years to come.   
 
1 We thank Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer, Bhikhu Parekh and Simon Thompson for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 It is striking just how many of the political theorists who Levey (2019a, pp.204-205) lists call themselves liberals. 
3 A critic might ask why Uberoi (2008; 2009) initially wrote about Canadian multiculturalism, if he was focused 
on Britain. The answer is that those early pieces were part of an attempt to see what Britain can learn from Canada 
about promoting national identity (Uberoi, 2007). 
4 See Kymlicka’s (2002, p.339) excellent division of the debate about multiculturalism into a number of stages. 
5 Levey (2008, 2018, 2019b) is exceptional among LMs because of his continuous and impressive work on 
national identity. 
6 Such dialogue takes a particular form in BSM scholarship that is best described by Parekh (2000a, pp.268-273) 
but others such as Charles Taylor value it too albeit for subtly different reasons. (See Modood 2017). 
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